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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Even though this action was filed in the Sixth Judicial
District Court in February of 1985, no answer was ever entered by
the defendants.

Rather the defendants 1 attorney made a special

appearance and asked the court to dismiss on the basis that the
action filed in the Sixth Judicial District Court was the same
•as one filed in the Fourth Judicial District.

The plaintiff

responded in a Memorandum in Opposition to the defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, arguing that the cases were quite distinct and
outlining the issues in the case he had filed in counter
distinction with those named in the Fourth Judicial District.

The

latter case was one which had been filed by DAVIS and DYER, as the
plaintiffs, against HATCH, as the defendant.
In spite of the fact that the issues as outlined were
entirely distinct and separate and that one of the causes of
action cited was for quiet title and that the quiet title could
only be obtained in the county in which the real property is
located, the lower court judge granted the defendants 1 Motion to
Dismiss on the basis that the two cases were the same!
of dismissal was granted on the 8th day of October 1985.

His order
This

appeal was filed on the 18th day of October 1985.

RELIEF ON APPEAL
The appellant asks the lower court's Order of Dismissal
be vacated and the case remanded.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For several years, HATCH has served REDC as its general
partner.

The limited partnership has as its major asset a large

tract of recreation land in Kane County, south of Cedar Breaks
National Monument.
terms in 1971.

The land was purchased on highly

leveraged

It was projected that property sales would produce

the capital necessary to fund the payments.
seldom the case.

However, this was

As a result, there were several years when

HATCH was required to raise the money needed, often out of his own
funds.
As a result, when the trust deed note was finally paid
off, the limited partnership owed HATCH considerable sums of
money.

As soon as the property was free and clear, and no longer

in financial jeopardy, certain of the limited partners, namely
DAVIS and DYER, sought to force the liquidation of the partnership
assets in order to get a return of their investment capital.
HATCH, the general partner, resisted their attempts at a forced
liquidation, preferring an orderly liquidation.

At the same time,

HATCH asserted the right to be reimbursed for monies advanced to
the partnership by himself and others.
DAVIS and DYER sued for "conflict of interest, breach of
fiduciary, self-dealing" and failure to provide regular financial
statements.

They also asked the Fourth Judicial District Court

for a distribution of the partnership assets.
A jury trial was held in May of 1984 before a judge of
the Fourth Judicial District Court, but to date no judgement has
ever been entered.

Nor have any findings of fact or conclusion of

law been prepared, much less entered.
While no determination whatsoever was made, or even
asked for, as to the right of the respective parties to control
the partnership, the respondents DAVIS and DYER have presumed to
act for the partnership since the trial even though the appellant
HATCH is still the general partner of record!

Their acts include

the sale of partnership property, without so much as an accounting
of the proceeds of sale to HATCH or the other partners.
Based on these actions by the respondents DAVIS and
DYER, all of which have occurred since the trial was had in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, HATCH brought action against them
in the Sixth Judicial Court for an accounting, for an injunction
against them from acting as the general partners for REDC, for a
return of money due HATCH by the partnership, for an order by the
court confirming the priority of distribution as outlined in the
general partnership agreement, and for an order quieting title to
the real property belonging to the partnership.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the lower court, the attorney for the defendants,
DAVIS and DYER, had argued lack of jurisdiction based on the
assertion that the same issues were currently pending in another
district.
assertion.

In his Order of Dismissal, Judge Tibbs agreed with that
He apparently failed to compare the two cases-

truth, the only thing which was the same were the parties.
in that instance, the roles were reversed (the plaintiff

In
Even

parties

in the first action being sued as defendants in the second
action).
However, the point of greatest significance is that the
matters being complained of in the second action had not even
occurred when a trial was had in the first action.

Furthermore,

one of the reliefs being sought in the action subject to this
review is a quieting of title to the real property owned by the
partnership.

This can only be done in the county in which the

real property lies.

See Utah Code annotated (1953), Section

78-13-1 of the Judicial Code.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE ISSUES IN THIS LAWSUIT ARE CLEARLY NOT THOSE IN
THE CASE PENDING BEFORE THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT.

In our Statement of Facts, paragraph three, we cited the
five causes of action brought by the respondents, DAVIS and DYER,
in the initial action in the Fourth Judicial District Court.

In

our final paragraph under Statement of Facts, we have recited the
five causes of action brought by the appellant, HATCH.

None of

these issues is the same as those issues in the previous case.
All of the issues raised by the appellant, HATCH, have become
matters for litigation because of the actions of the respondents,
DAVIS and DYER, since the earlier case was tried.
The right of the appellant, HATCH, to pursue these
causes of action is so clearly supported by the rule, Section
78-11-8 of the Judicial Code, Utah Code annotated
further authority hardly needs mentioning.

(1953), that

However, we shall cite

Mitchell v Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. (Utah, 1954):

Where it did not appear that subject matter and
issues were the same, action was not barred by
action pending in same district court involving
same parties. (265 P. 2d 1016)
We might also cite a Nevada case on the same point,
Volpert v. Papagna

(1967):

Cause of action must be same before a pending suit
may abate one subsequently commenced. (433 P. 2d 533)
POINT II:

THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AND IT ALONE,
HAS PROPER JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER BECAUSE IT
INVOLVES A QUIETING OF TITLE.

The Utah Judicial Code provides that an action "for the
recovery of real property or of an estate or interest therein, or
for the determination in any form of such right or interest...must
be tried in the county in which the subject of the action
situated."

is

See Utah Code annotated (1953), Section 78-13-1.
CONCLUSION
It was error for Judge Tibbs to grant Defendants' Motion

to Dismiss based on "improper venue" since any action

involving

quiet title must be filed in the county where the real property is
located.

The fact that a case is pending in Utah County

involving

the same parties has no relevance since the issues in the two
cases are distinct and the matters which gave rise to the second
action have arisen since a trial in the first action.

Clearly,

Judge Tibbs' Order of Dismissal should be set aside and the case
remanded.
DATED this 11th day of December, 1985.

'dfrfafl.

oward F. H a ^ h , Pro se

ADDENDUM "A

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR COUNTY OF KANE
STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD F. HATCH,
Plaintlff

'

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

-vs-

CIVIL NO. 2046

R. CRAWFORD DAVIS, WILLIAM
G. DYER, individually and as
General Partners for REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS,
Defendants
The Defendants Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of
improper Venue=and that case between the same parties is pending
in Utah County=is Granted.
Dated t h i s " Qr-^jay /fff^October, 1985.

\»

D0N>>JIBBS
DISTRICT Jtf9G£.

. v1J3L

- C-EWI-F-ICATE -GF-MILING
Mailed a copy of the above Order to the following, postage
prepaid from offices at Manti, Utah:
Howard F. Hatch, Pro se, P.O. Box 190, Provo, Utah, 84603
Michael E. Dyer, Attorney for Defendants, CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84110
Dated this A

day of October, 1985

Carole B. Mel lor
Trial Court Executive

ADDENDUM

78-11-8

JUDICIAL

"B

CODE

M a s t e r ' s l i a b i l i t y for injury to or death
of person, or damage to property, resulting from tire allegedly caused by s e r v a n t ' s
smoking, 20 A. L. R.'lM 89.'?.
Measure of damages for death in action
for benefit of decedent's e s t a t e , 163 A.
L . R. 253.
Modern s t a t u s of rule d e n y i n g a common-law recovery for wrongful death, 61
A. L. R. 3d 906.'
Owner's or keeper's liability for personal
injury or death inflicted l>v wild animal,
21 A. L. R. 3d 003.
Pension, r e t i r e m e n t income, social sec u r i t y p a y m e n t s , and the like, of deceased,
as affecting recovery in wrongful d e a t h
action, 81 A. L. R. 2d 949.
Proof of prospective e a r n i n g capacity of
s t u d e n t or trainee, or of i t s loss, in action
for personal injury or death, 15 A. L. R.
2d 418.
Recovery of nominal damages in wrongful death action, 69 A. L. R. 2d 628.
Recovery of p r e j u d g m e n t i n t e r e s t on
wrongful d e a t h damages, 96 A. L. R. 2d
1104.
Res ipsa loquitor in actions a g a i n s t
owner or occupant of premises for personal
injury, death, or p r o p e r t y d a m a g e caused
b y fire, 8 A. L. R. 3d 974.
R i g h t of action for injury to or d e a t h
of woman who consented to illegal abortion, 36 A. L. R. 3d 630.
R i g h t of action for wrongful d e a t h as

subject to claims of creditors, 35 A. L. R.
2d 1443.
Right of personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e appointed at the forum or in a jurisdiction
where decedent was domiciled or where
the tort occurred, to m a i n t a i n action for
death under foreign s t a t u t e which provides t h a t action shall be brought by
executor or a d m i n i s t r a t o r , 85 A. L. R.
1231, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1016.
Right of substitution of successive personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s as p a r t v plaintiff,
164 A. Ij. R. 702.
Right to m a i n t a i n action for wrongful
death for benefit of nonresident aliens,
138 A. L. R. 684.
R i g h t to m a i n t a i n direct action a g a i n s t
fellow employee for injury or death covered by workmen's compensation, 21 A.
L. R. 3d 845.
Right to recover for death resulting
from emotional d i s t u r b a n c e , in absence of
impact or other actionable wrong, 64 A.
L. R. 2d 100.
Venue of wrongful d e a t h action, 36
A. L. R. 2d 1146.
Wrongful death damages for loss of
expectancy of i n h e r i t a n c e from decedent,
91 A. L. R. 2d 477.
Law Reviews.
Note, A P r i m e r on D a m a g e s u n d e r the
Utah Wrongful Death and S u r v i v a l Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER

LAW

former 104-3-1 or any other section to
determine t h a t m a t t e r . J o h a n s o n v. Cudahy P a c k i n g Co., 107 U. 114, 152 P. 2d 98.

Person entitled to sue.
F o r m e r 104-3-11 expressly stated who
should bring the a c t i o n ; accordingly, it
was not necessary to have recourse to

78-11-8. Successive actions on same contract—When permitted.—Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction
whenever, after a former action, a new cause of action arises therefrom.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-11-8.
Collateral References.
Action<$=>53(3).
1 C.J.S. Actions § 103.
1 Am. J u r . 2d 647 et seq., Actions § 127
ct seq.

Simultaneous injury to person and prope r t y as g i v i n g rise to single cause of action, 62 A. L. R. 2d 977.
Single cause of action rule as affecting
r i g h t s a n d remedies of p r o p e r t y insurer
as against third person tort-feasor who
has settled with insured, 92 A. L. R. 2d
147.

78-11-9. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 78-11-9 ( L . 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C.
1943, Supp., 104-11-15), relating to consent

of the s t a t e to be sued in certain cases involving real and peisonal property, was
repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 211, § 1."

78-11-10. Actions against officers—Costs and attorneys' fees.—Before
any action may be filed against any sheriff, constable, peace officer, state
166

ADDENDUM " C "

PLACE OF TRIAL—VENUE

78-13-1

hee (ubcs in the t w o ) car statute of him
tations, and providing fo. a separate trial
in these cases of the statute of limitations
i s s u e - L . 1971, eh. 212.

Collateral References,
L l m l t a t l 0 n 0 f Aetiona*»176 et seq.
M
53 c j s
Limitatl0na of Actl0ns
§ 398.
51 Am# Jur
2d 943) L l m l t a t l 0 n J
Ac.

Cross Reference.
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, limitation section, 78-14-4.

tlons

§§ 4 8 7 »

ias

-

CHAPTER 13
PLACE OP TRIAL—VENUE
Section 78-13-1.
78-13-2.
78-13-3.
78-13-4.
78-13-5.
78-13-6.
78-13-7.
78-13-8.
78-13-9.
78-13-10.
78-13-11.

Actions respecting real property.
Actions to recover hues or penalties—Against public officers.
Actions against a county.
Actions on written contracts.
Transitory actions—Residence of corporations.
Arising without this state in favor ot resident.
All other actions.
Change of venue—Conditions precedent.
Grounds.
Court to which transfer is to be m ide
Duty of clerk—Fees and costs—Litect on jurisdiction.

78-13-1. Actions respecting real property.—Actions for the following
causes must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action,
or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of the court to
change the place of trial as provided in thib Code:
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest
therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest,
and for injuries to real property.
(2) For the partition of real property.
(3) For the foreclosure of all hens and mortgages on real property.
Where the real property is situated partly in one county and partly
in another, the plaintiff may select either of the counties, and the county
so selected is the proper county for the trial of such action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-1.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-4-1 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Gross-Reference.
Defense of improper venue, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), (d).
Construction.
Tly giving a sensible and effective meaning to ail the piovisions of this act, and
considering them together, only rational
conclusion is that legislature intended to
establish the general right of persons sued
to have the action tried in the county
where one of them resides, and that acturns which may be tried elsewhere are

limited and restricted to those which the
act itself excepts from the general rule.
Buckle v Ogdeu Fuinituie & Carpet Co,
559, 210 P. 084, construing former
0i u
statute
Constitutionality.
Predecessor section was not inconsistent
Const Art. VIII, § 5
Sherman v.
Wlth
Droubay, 27 U 47, 74 P 348, Snyder v.
Pike, 30 U. 102, 83 P 692.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Pecice which undertook to adjudicate
water rights beyond jurisdiction of court,
held void on its face Albion Idaho Land
Co v Nat Irr Co, 97 T. 2d 439, applying
former statute,
Mortgage foreclosure,
Under this section action to foreclose

249

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were hand delivered or mailed to the attorney for the
Defendants by first class mail, postage prepaid, this 11th day of
December, 1985 and addressed as follows:
Mr. Michael D. Dyer
CSB Tower
Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110

Howard F. Hatch

